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a timeless environment
where the
time-variable does not alterate any
equation, entropy, decay, and irreversibility of time dominate the world
of the living. Prigogine and Stengers
tried to connect these environments to
of a new alliance
Giacomo Marramao,
professor of the possibility
between "hard" sciences and human
Philosophy of Politics at the Istituto
Universitario Orientate in Naples, is sciences. However, Marramao points
out, Prigogine and Stengers still seem
one of the young Italian philosophers
who are trying to keep on the task of to view the asymmetry of time as
something anomalous, versus the symthinking
"after"
and "beyond"
Heidegger. In so doing, they are con- metry. They are still looking for the
"sufficient reason" of asymmetry, and
fronted with the most demanding
so they are repeating the well-known
words of the Western tradition, the
metaphysical gesture of looking for
same problems Heidegger investigatthe fondamentum inconcussum.
ed all his life: being, time, experience,
From this point on, Marramao
feeling, representation, and image. Is
turns to Leibniz and Heidegger for a
it possible to re-consider these words
in a way that is not just a repetition of new look at the issue of the principle
of sufficient reason, which starts with
what Heidegger has already done?
the "most important" of all questions:
It is a risky task, which forces the
philosopher to draw lines and to cre- Why something instead of nothing?
But the question, too, is based on the
ate divisions in a vast territory, leaving
plenty of space for criticism.
So assumption that Nothing comes before
Being, that Nothing is more "origiMarramao is forced to sketch a very
nary" than Being.
On his part,
short "history of time" at the beginning of his book. In Marramao' s Heidegger has given more importance
to the event of Leibniz's question than
account, Plato's and Aristotle's definito the ontological problem that the
tion of time, although based on reprequestion poses. In Marramao's opinsentation and number, did not clearly
ion, Heidegger failed to grasp the
divide between "internal" and "external" time, between aion and chronos, importance of the issue, applying a
reductionist
view to Leibniz and
or, in Latin, aevum and tempus. This
Descartes in order to build his "onto"classical"
balance cracked with
Augustine.
Internal time (distensio historical" periodization of modernity.
animi) was separated from the "time of The real problem is that, after
Descartes and Leibniz, the "classical"
the world." Inner time became ecstatic; external time, on the contrary, was balance between subject and reality
was lost, so that reality increasingly
imagined as a line. Augustine's distinction became rule in philosophy, all was constructed and shaped by the
the way up to Husserl. And, after
subject. On this regard, the role of perHusserl and Einstein, many tried to spective became essential, both in
include the "psychological arrow" of Renaissance painting and in the develtime in the scientific vision of the uniopment of thought. The transcendenverse-11 ya Prigogine and Isabelle
tal, Kantian subject entered Western
Stengers among them. The latter have
thought with the Renaissance perspecdiscovered,
or re-discovered,
that
tive.
From then on, perspective
nature is asymmetrical to time. While
(linked to space) and expectation
the laws of physics seem to operate in (linked to time), began to be superim-
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posed on each other.
But time "in itself," so Marramao
argues,
is never to be found.
Heidegger's
identity of time and
Being is not satisfactory . As we know
from Augustine to Husserl, time is
philosophy's hell. No one has ever
been able to describe time without
using metaphors borrowed from the
realm of space. So, if time has always
been representation of time, what is
representation?
Heidegger made us aware that perspective, transformation of the world
into image, Descartes' emphasis on
method, and Nietzsche 's Will to Power
are all in a line, all steps along the history of subject.
In the long run,
nihilism and constructivism coincide.
But, Marramao insists, Heidegger
underestimated the pathos at the bottom of Descartes' cogito. After the
Copernican revolution and its destruction of the faith in the senses, cogito
remained the only pillar on which the
world was built. This is what makes
nihilism apparently unsurpassable.
The development of subjectivity gave
then birth, as Foucault pointed out, to
the project of history, to the "birth of
man" as subject and object of the representation- that is, included in its own
representation of the world. But, this
triumph of the representation turned
out to be the beginning of its end. In
Marramao' s opinion, Foucault showed
how the transcend en ta! subject
"exploded" from representation
to
endless drift (deriva), his periodization
of Modernity opposes validly Heidegger's. It is still an hermeneutic circle,
but, at the same time, the vertigo of
infinite self-reference.
The problem is that perspective
engulfs experience. In order to have
more time, everything is temporalized.
Historical conscience and museification of the past proceed on parallel
tracks. As Benjamin stressed, the outcome of modernity is the impoverish-
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ment of real experience. Is it possible
to fill in the empty space between
experience and perspective, present
time and expectation, existence and
project?
According to Marramao, Benjamin
and Heidegger do not give us any
non-metaphysical answer to the question. Neither do some recent developments of Italian philosophy, from the
hope in an epiphanic healing from
nihilism in Emanuele Severino, to the
dissolution of the subject advocated by
Gianni Vattimo.
Marramao' s proposal is to move
aside of the problem (spostamento laterale). We need another visualization.
What generates the assumption that
time has a direction?
In order to
answer, it takes an anti-anthropomorphic view, as provided by the most
recent scientific discoveries. But here,
instead of going deeper into the current scientific debate, Marramao turns
to Baudelaire.
In Les fleurs du ma/,
Baudelaire
deprives
time of any
"time" metaphor, using only "space"
metaphors instead.
In Baudelaire,
experience is, so to speak, spatialized.
Like in Plato's Thymaeus, Baudelaire's
time is aion. There is no "inside":
inside is out, and the original cosmological experience
is reduced
to
anthropology no more.
Marramao's points are worthy of
attention, and, at their best, challenging. What causes perplexity is the
quick pace of the book and its enormously ambitious purpose squeezed
into 154 pages.
The transitions
between
Leibniz's
question,
the
author's criticism of Heidegger, the
Renaissance
perspective,
and
Descartes' method are too fast. While
reproaching Heidegger for being easy
in historical periodization, Marramao
does his best to out-Heidegger
Heidegger. Maybe Heidegger is not
aware of the pathos underlying
Descartes' cogito , but this does not
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change Heidegger's point. In Was ist
das-die Philosophie?,Heidegger stresses that since Descartes the Greek
pathos (the "sense of wonder" before
the Kosmos) has been replaced by
method and the quest for certainty.
This is the experience of modernity.
Besides,
"spatializing"
time, as
Baudelaire did, is no solution to the
philosophical dead end of time's issue.
It is Marramao himself who points out
that time has always been "spatially"
represented.
Furthermore,
Baudelaire's "spatialization" of time looks
more like the fulfillment of the project
of modernity than the restoration of a
"classical" balance that is lost and it is
not possible to revive. Yet, Baudelaire
understands
the symbolic, aionic
power of metaphors more than any
other modern poet, but his aim is t~
clarify his vision in a way that is not
opposed
to Descartes ' project.
Baudelaire "spatializes" time to put it
mto perspective, in the most clear and
visible representation. It is hard to see
how Baudelaire can be included in
Marramao's spostamentolaterale. Why
didn't Marramao proceed to investigate the relationship between time and
the current bio-physical
sciences?
Prigogine's metaphysics is not the
only one which needs to be "deconstructed."
ALESSANDRO CARRERA

University of Houston
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lnstitutiones Oratoriae
By Giambattista Vico
Critical text, notes, and introductory
essay by Giuliano Crifo.
Naples: lstituto
Suor Orsola
Benincasa, 1989

The difficult circumstances of Giambattista Vico's life are well-documented. The son of a bookseller of
very modest means, he managed to
earn a degree in law, despite many difficulties.
After several years ("a
stranger in his own country")
at
Vatolla nel Cilento as a tutor to the
sons of the rich Marquis Domenico
Rocca, Vico decided in 1699, at the age
of 31, to compete for the chair of
rhetoric at the University of Naples.
Although he had originally intended
to teach rhetoric only temporarily,
upon winning the chair he resigned
himself to going no further, disappointed and embittered in his hopes to
win a chair of law. Rhetoric thus
became for the Neapolitan philosopher the study of a lifetime.
It is to his teaching of that "most
difficult art of saying" that we owe the
Institutiones Oratoriae, his collected
university lectures, which he clearly
made his students study. An abbreviated Italian version was published in
1844 and republished the following
year in a Latin edition based on the
original text put forth by Vico in 1711.
The Institutiones have never been of
particular
interest
to the historiography of Vico's philosophy, considered as they are to be of little
importance in the general structure of
his thought and even today dismissed
as a "merely academic task," a dry,
sterile work of compilation, according
to the view expressed by Italian N eoId ealism, and particularly by Fausto
Nicolini. Furthermore, the many studies by Nicolini alone (who with Croce
also edited the critical edition of Vico's

